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INTRODUCTION
To examine always-listening device issues and their impact on Nevada, this
Note will proceed in five parts. Part I will discuss the general technological and
legal background of always-listening devices—how they came to be and how
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courts have handled them so far. Part II will address possible evidentiary issues
with always-listening device transcripts and audio recordings—how they are currently treated as evidence and how courts should treat them as evidence. Part III
will parse through the Constitutional issues consistently connected with using
recordings and transcripts from always-listening devices as evidence. Part IV
will then cover how new laws concerning always-listening devices could impact
criminal trials and deter domestic violence. Finally, Part V will present recommendations for specific legislation for Nevada to adopt.
I.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR MODERN ISSUES

A. Development of Always-Listening Devices
The past half-decade introduced a new presence into many American households. In 2019, sixty-six million American adults owned a smart speaker (“always-listening device”), which was up nearly 40 percent from ownership in
2018.1 According to Forbes.com, 42 percent of always-listening device owners
believe their devices are essential to their everyday lives.2 These numbers indicate a growing trend in the American household that is not likely to falter anytime
soon. As tech giants like Amazon, Google, and Apple develop always-listening
devices, the devices become cheaper to produce and more equipped to solve users’ problems. As the devices become cheaper and more convenient, users are
more incentivized to purchase them. With this pairing of development and demand, it may not be long until always-listening devices find themselves in more
American households than not.3
While always-listening devices themselves are rapidly growing in popularity, the convenient services provided for the devices’ users stem from the software behind the speakers. Smart assistants, like Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri,
and Google’s Google Assistant, interact with users through the always-listening
devices and can access online data for the users with the ease and speed of a
person-to-person conversation.4 Whether a user needs to set an alarm, look up
1

Bret Kinsella, U.S. Smart Speaker Ownership Rises 40% in 2018 to 66.4 Million and Amazon Echo Maintains Market Share Lead Says New Report from Voicebot, VOICEBOT.AI (Mar.
7, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://voicebot.ai/2019/03/07/u-s-smart-speaker-ownership-rises-40-in2018-to-66-4-million-and-amazon-echo-maintains-market-share-lead-says-new-report-fromvoicebot [https://perma.cc/L438-HV9H].
2
Rebecca Lerner, Smart Speakers Are the Future of Audio, FORBES (June 23, 2017, 12:49
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccalerner/2017/06/23/smart-speakers-are-the-futureof-audio/ [https://perma.cc/Y4NR-3N7C].
3
See LOUP VENTURES, SMART SPEAKER HOUSEHOLD PENETRATION RATE IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM 2014 TO 2025, STATISTA (2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1022847/uni
ted-states-smart-speaker-household-penetration [https://perma.cc/8ZG4-PTNN] (projecting
always-listening devices will penetrate 50 percent of American households by 2021 and 75
percent by 2025).
4
See, e.g., All Things Alexa: Alexa Features, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/b/ref=aeg_l
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the weather, or listen to their horoscope, smart assistants are able to dig through
the internet and return the requested information in a matter of seconds.5
Smart assistants are not just search engines for always-listening devices.
True, Apple was the first company to bring smart assistants to mainstream consumers when Siri was released on the iPhone 4s in 2011.6 However, Apple did
not create Siri. Siri was originally an artificial intelligence program created for
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency by SRI International.7 In 2010,
SRI published the original Siri personal assistant app and within two months
Steve Jobs began the process of purchasing Siri.8
Siri was originally only accessible to users utilizing the Siri function on their
iPhones.9 However, Apple introduced a new function in 2014 allowing users to
access Siri by saying “Hey Siri.”10 That same year, Amazon entered the smart
assistant market with their own program called Amazon Alexa.11 Alexa differed
from Siri in that Alexa was not restricted to a smart phone. Instead, Alexa was
primarily accessible through Amazon’s Echo, a small smart speaker to be placed
in rooms within users’ homes and connected to their home wifi.12 Amazon’s cointroduction of Alexa and Echo marked the age of smart assistants merging with
always-listening devices.
Amazon’s Alexa also marked a distinct shift in the direction of smart assistants because it separated the smart assistant from the smart phone. Where Siri
was a feature that essentially extended the search functions already offered on
p_features/ref=s9_acss_bw_cg_aeglp_md1_w?node=17934672011&pf_rd_m [https://perma.
cc/CU69-CY5F]; Siri Does More Than Ever. Even Before You Ask., APPLE, https://www.apple.com/siri [https://perma.cc/DJ3B-DNR4]; How Can We Help You? What You Can Ask Your
Google Assistant, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/assistant/?hl=en#topic=7658431 [http
s://perma.cc/PJ54-BW4].
5
See Ali Montag, Here’s What People Actually Use Their Amazon Echo and Other Smart
Speakers for, CNBC (Sept. 10, 2018, 1:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/10/adobe-analytics-what-people-use-amazon-echo-and-smart-speakers-for.html [https://perma.cc/7NDG8NSL].
6
Press Release, Apple, Apple Launches iPhone 4s, iOS 5 & iCloud (Oct. 4, 2011), https://ww
w.apple.com/newsroom/2011/10/04Apple-Launches-iPhone-4S-iOS-5-iCloud [https://perma.
cc/4HZG-9K69].
7
Bianca Bosker, Siri Rising: The Inside Story of Siri’s Origins – and Why She Could Overshadow the iPhone, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/siri-do-engineapple-iphone_n_2499165 [https://perma.cc/X257-G83D].
8
Id.
9
Parmy Olson, Steve Jobs Leaves a Legacy in A.I. with Siri, FORBES (Oct. 6, 2011, 12:24
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2011/10/06/steve-jobs-leaves-a-legacy-in-a-i
-with-siri [https://perma.cc/G6QD-KXZ2].
10
Jason Cipriani, What You Need to Know About ‘Hey, Siri’ in iOS 8, CNET (Sept. 18, 2014,
12:00 PM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/what-you-need-to-know-about-hey-siri-in-ios-8 [ht
tps://perma.cc/ET25-MGW9].
11
Darrell Etherington, Amazon Echo Is a $199 Connected Speaker Packing an Always-On
Siri-Style Assistant, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 6, 2014, 9:14 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2014/11/
06/amazon-echo [https://perma.cc/8QLK-YVPD].
12
Id.
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internet-connected mobile smartphones, Alexa operated through home-bound
always-listening devices.13 Additionally, while Siri was fully functional without
activating the “Hey Siri” function that turned a user’s phone into an always-listening device, Alexa had no such setting.14 Alexa appears to have started as, and
largely remained, a smart assistant intended to operate through always-listening
devices.15
While this might have merely been a philosophical difference between Apple and Amazon at first, the development of the technology has revealed that
always-listening devices are the future of smart assistants. In 2016, Google
joined the always-listening device market by releasing Google Assistant,
Google’s own smart assistant accessible through its own always-listening device,
Google Home.16 Google Home is a device that, both in appearance and use, mirrored Amazon’s Echo.17
Google has since extended the Google Assistant program to their smart
phones and certain Android devices, but it primarily exists as a part of Google
Home and Google’s new “smart display” devices.18 In response, Amazon also
extended the Alexa program by creating the Amazon Alexa App for
smartphones.19 Yet, Apple has also followed Amazon’s path with the release of
the HomePod,20 an always-listening device which integrates Siri into users’
smart homes.
While smart assistants may have begun as a smart phone app, always-listening devices may serve as the primary utilization of the technology.21 With that
transition looming, users who decide to purchase and activate an always-listening device must consider what this new presence will change about their privacy
within their homes.

13

Id.
Id.
15
Jared Newman, For Amazon, the Future of Alexa Is About the End of the Smartphone Era,
FAST CO. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40479207/for-amazon-the-future-ofalexa-is-about-the-end-of-the-smartphone-era [https://perma.cc/HXB3-KV3J].
16
Steve Kovach, Google Unveils Its Newest Major Product: The Google Home Speaker, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 4, 2016, 9:58 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/google-home-announcedprice-release-date-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/3E32-QFGD].
17
Aaron Tilley, Google Home vs. Amazon Echo: Everything You Need to Know, FORBES (Oct.
4, 2016, 5:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2016/10/04/google-home-vs-amazon-echo [https://perma.cc/MUZ7-FQMC].
18
Dieter Bohn, Google Is Introducing a New Smart Display Platform, THE VERGE (Jan. 8,
2018, 8:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/8/16860142 [https://perma.cc/A9J3-HZP
S].
19
Amazon Alexa App Details and Download, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Amazoncom-Amazon-Alexa/dp/B00P03D4D2 [https://perma.cc/JY4K-TYFS].
20
HomePod, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/homepod [https://web.archive.org/web/2020101
1065142/https://www.apple.com/homepod/].
21
Kovach, supra note 16.
14
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B. Always-Listening Devices in the Law
The original legal issues Siri faced as the first-to-market smart assistant included, inter alia, the following: copyright, ownership of intellectual property,
liability issues for reliance on Siri’s mistakes.22 However, now that smart assistants are intertwined with always-listening devices, a new set of issues must be
addressed.
The biggest difference for Siri in the past decade is that a user in 2012 had
to press a button to prompt Siri to begin listening, and a user in 2019 simply
needs to say, “Hey Siri.”23 This change is incredibly important in the scope of
legal issues because it begs the following question: how does Siri know to listen
only when someone says “Hey Siri” if Siri is not already listening? More directly,
are Siri/Alexa/Google devices recording all of our conversations? Apple, Amazon, and Google have all addressed this question with a concrete “no.”24 However, the companies do admit that when an always-listening device is activated,
the transcript of questions and answers is stored on the respective company’s
cloud.25
Those transcripts, while private, are not exclusively accessible to the user
who participated in their creation.26 Amazon allows users to go into their account
settings and manually delete audio recordings held in the Amazon cloud but otherwise retains recordings and transcribes indefinitely.27 Even if the recordings
are deleted, however, Amazon retains underlying data such as what actions were
taken by Alexa in response to the question, purchase records processed through
Alexa, and others.28 Google fully discloses that it will share transcripts to “[m]eet
any applicable law, regulation, legal process, or enforceable governmental request.”29
Apple, Amazon, and Google have also come under fire because their devices
listened in when they were not supposed to. For example, in 2017, a San Diego
22

John Weaver, Siri Is My Client: A First Look at Artificial Intelligence and Legal Issues,
N.H. BAR J., Winter 2012, at 6, 7–9.
23
Cipriani, supra note 10.
24
Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/displ
ay.html?nodeId=201602230 [https://perma.cc/CD65-22F6]; Lisa Vaas, Siri Is Listening to
You, but She’s NOT Spying, Says Apple, NAKED SEC. (Aug. 13, 2018), https://nakedsecurity.so
phos.com/2018/08/13/siri-is-listening-to-you-but-shes-not-spying-says-apple [https://perma.c
c/LH7L-BCX4]; Data Security and Privacy on Devices That Work with Assistant, GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/googlenest/answer/7072285 [https://perma.cc/MH2R-N3RH].
25
Alexa, Echo Devices, and Your Privacy, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=GVP69FUJ48X9DK8V [https://perma.cc/7Z3Y-UU36].
26
Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 24.
27
Charlie Osborne, Amazon Confirms Alexa Customer Voice Recordings Are Kept Forever,
ZDNET (July 3, 2019, 2:49 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/amazon-confirms-alexa-customer-voice-recordings-are-kept-forever [https://perma.cc/R7VJ-7VFM].
28
Id.
29
Privacy Policy: When You Share Your Information, GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/pr
ivacy?hl=en#infosharing [https://perma.cc/2JLJ-8VXT].
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news anchor reporting on a child who ordered a doll house through her family’s
Amazon Echo stated, “I love the little girl saying, ‘Alexa ordered me a dollhouse.’ ”30 While the original story may have merely been a humorous misunderstanding, Amazon faced criticism when several Echo devices in San Diego
homes heard the broadcast and proceeded to order dollhouses for their owners.31
While the devices were technically activated by the trigger word “Alexa,” the
users did not specifically speak to the device and ask it to do anything. This misunderstanding begs a more serious question; what happens if transcripts are
brought in as evidence against an always-listening device’s owner in criminal
court when there is a chance the defendant was not the one being recorded and
transcribed?
This was an important issue for Arkansas in State v. Bates.32 In late 2016,
reports indicated that police in Arkansas were attempting to gain access to audio
recordings from a murder suspect’s Amazon Echo device.33 The man, James
Bates, hosted a viewing party for some football games, and the next morning one
of his guests was found dead in Bates’ backyard hot tub.34 During their investigation, police noticed the Amazon Echo device located in Bates’ kitchen and
seized it.35 They were able to gain some information from the device, but they
were unable to tell if the device had recorded any audio around the time of the
murder.36 The police then obtained a search warrant for the device’s cloud-based
information and demanded that Amazon submit any recording information from
the device, but Amazon did not fully comply.37
Instead of turning over all of the data, Amazon submitted only Bates’ account information and purchase history.38 Amazon then released a statement affirming: “Amazon will not release customer information without a valid and
binding legal demand properly served on us. Amazon objects to overbroad or
otherwise inappropriate demands as a matter of course.”39

30

Andrew Liptak, Amazon’s Alexa Started Ordering People Dollhouses After Hearing Its
Name on TV, THE VERGE (Jan. 7, 2017, 5:52 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/7/14200
210 [https://perma.cc/38BG-Y8U3].
31
Id.
32
Memorandum of Law in Support of Amazon’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant at 6–7,
Arkansas v. Bates, No. CR-2016-370-2 (Cir. Ct. Ark. Feb. 17, 2017).
33
Alina Selyukh, As We Leave More Digital Tracks, Amazon Echo Factors in Murder Investigation, NPR: ALL TECH CONSIDERED (Dec. 28, 2016, 3:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections
/alltechconsidered/2016/12/28/507230487 [https://perma.cc/L242-ZZ62].
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
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While Amazon’s stance on the issue was never tested in that Arkansas courtroom,40 Bates showed that Amazon was willing to stand by users of their alwayslistening device to prevent potentially errant recordings from being used against
them.
This issue is not one that will just go away. With always-listening devices
gaining steady popularity year after year, it is inevitable that something like the
situation in Arkansas will come up again. For that reason, rather than waiting for
the equally inevitable litigation to create common law based on specific circumstances, Nevada must legislate these issues.
C. Nevada’s Historical Approach to Recordings
Nevada considers the unauthorized recording of a conversation a felony.41
That means that no party may have their communications recorded and used
against them in court without their consent. It may appear that this solves the
issue of state prosecutors using always-listening device transcripts against their
users; however, Nevadans are not saved by the lack of explicit consent to being
recorded.
Nevada requires all parties to a communication consent to being recorded
for the recording to be lawful.42 This precludes the admission of telephone recordings taken without a defendant’s consent against them in a criminal trial.43
Unfortunately, that statutory protection is unlikely to prevent the admission of
recordings from always-listening devices. Once activated, always-listening devices necessarily record users and transmit information over the internet.44 This
should be no secret to users who automatically consent to their recordings being
used to improve their experience upon activating their always-listening device.45
If consent to being recorded is a necessary part of the always-listening device
experience, it is unlikely that a court would consider the recordings to be intercepted without consent of the user.
40

“[A] circuit court judge granted [Arkansas prosecutors’] request to have the charges . . . dismissed. The prosecutors declared nolle prosequi, [a formal notice that there will be no further
prosecution], stating that the evidence could support more than one reasonable explanation.”
Colin Dwyer, Arkansas Prosecutors Drop Murder Case That Hinged on Evidence from Amazon Echo, NPR: THE TWO-WAY (Nov. 29, 2017, 5:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thet
wo-way/2017/11/29/567305812 [https://perma.cc/37R4-QRRR] (emphasis added).
41
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.620, 690 (2019); Ditech Fin. LLC v. Buckles, 401 P.3d 215, 217
(Nev. 2017) (quoting Lane v. Allstate Ins. Co., 969 P.2d 938, 940 (Nev. 1998)).
42
Ditech, 401 P.3d at 217.
43
McLellan v. Nevada, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (Nev. 2008).
44
Richard Baguley & Colin McDonald, Appliance Science: Alexa, How Does Alexa Work?
The Science of the Amazon Echo, CNET (Aug. 4, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/new
s/appliance-science-alexa-how-does-alexa-work-the-science-of-amazons-echo/ [https://perm
a.cc/H73T-LEGA].
45
Alexa Terms of Use, AMAZON cl. 3.1, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.h
tml?nodeId=201809740 [https://perma.cc/3L3J-TEX3]. I leave the discussion of whether this
should qualify as consent to another note.
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With statutory protections absent, Nevadans must consider whether their use
of always-listening devices could expose them to liability. Nevada’s rules of evidence follow closely to the Federal Rules of Evidence. One section that is nearly
identical is Nevada’s section regarding treatment of records of regularly conducted activity.
A record made during the regular course of activity is an evidentiary exception presented in the federal system and in Nevada.46 Under Nevada Revised
Statute section 51.135, any record or compilation of data from information transmitted by a person with knowledge—during the course of a regularly conducted
activity—may be admitted as evidence in both civil and criminal trials.47 Under
a general reading of the law, recordings made by always-listening devices seem
to fall under this exception. An always-listening device records (creates a record
of) sounds and words (information transmitted) of users who utter the device’s
trigger word (by persons with knowledge) every time it is triggered (during regularly conducted activity).48
Records of a regularly conducted activity may very well apply to recordings
of purposefully directed questions. However, this should not be concerning for
the vast majority of individuals who mainly use their device for weather updates
and background music. What users should fear for is whether the exception allows the admissibility of recordings transcribed mistakenly.
This fear of mistakenly transcribed recordings is best explained through a
hypothetical similar to the San Diego incident mentioned above. One hypothetical user, Alex, owns an Amazon Echo device that is set to always listen for its
trigger word, “Alexa.” One night, Alex has several friends over to play the video
game Assassin’s Creed.49 At some point during the night, a friend needing advice
for Assassin’s Creed asks “Alex, how do you hide a body?”50 Alex’s Alexa is
mistakenly triggered by the word “Alex,” transcribes the request, and searches
the internet for “how to hide a body.” Several months later, Alex is falsely accused of murder and that same Alexa transcript is recovered by the prosecution.
Through the regularly conducted activity exception to hearsay, the prosecution
may successfully admit both “Alex’s” question and Alexa’s answer into evidence.51
Some may see this hypothetical as an example of a transcript being created
outside of regularly conducted business and determine that a system to properly
categorize purposeful statements from accidental statements must be established
for this technology to be acceptable in court at all. After all, the recording and
46

NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.135 (2019); FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.135 (2019).
48
See id.; Baguley & McDonald, supra note 44.
49
See Jack Fennimore, Assassin’s Creed Origins: 10 Tips & Tricks for Stealth, HEAVY (Oct.
27, 2017, 4:29 AM), https://heavy.com/games/2017/10/assassins-creed-origins-tips-tricks-ste
alth [https://perma.cc/E698-NKWU].
50
See id. (including the skill of hiding dead bodies among tips to play Assassin’s Creed).
51
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.135 (2019).
47
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transcribing of a user’s words outside of directly prompted requests is not the
regular activity of these companies.52 However, solving just this issue is not
likely to prohibit the use of these transcripts in court. While the hypothetical lists
“regularly conducted activity” as the method of admission, transcripts are not
restricted to a single avenue of admissibility. For instance, the hypothetical prosecution could have also prevailed by asserting the party opponent exception to
hearsay.53
The issue at hand, especially here in Nevada and in states with similar laws,
is that no single exception to hearsay prevents potentially fraudulent transcripts
into evidence. So, these states must address what can be done once the transcripts
are inevitably considered admissible under multiple exceptions to the hearsay
rule of evidence. To that point, courts outside of Nevada have not been able to
reach a clear conclusion. For instance, in the Bates case discussed above,54 Arkansas faced the challenge of determining what information the government
should be able to glean from always-listening devices without the guidance of
legislation.55
In Bates, the Arkansas court issued a search warrant requiring Amazon to
turn over voice recordings associated with the transcript that had been previously
subpoenaed.56 While the original transcript included plenty of information, the
prosecution needed the audio recordings to confirm Bates was the one who issued the questions.57 Amazon issued a lengthy motion in support of their users’
First Amendment rights to browse the internet anonymously.58 However, before
the court could issue a ruling on the matter, the defendant consented to the release
of his audio recordings.59
This Note argues that Nevada should not wait to face the same situation Arkansas faced in 2017. Instead of waiting for issues to arise in court to determine
the accessibility of these recordings to law enforcement and litigating parties,
Nevada’s legislature should amend statutes currently in place to include recordings from always-listening devices as information that may be requested by
52

See supra note 24.
A party’s own statement is not hearsay when it is offered into evidence against the party.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.035(3)(a); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(a).
54
See supra Section I.B.
55
Brian Heater, After Pushing Back, Amazon Hands over Echo Data in Arkansas Murder
Case, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 7, 2017, 6:26 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/07/amazon-ec
ho-murder [https://perma.cc/9CUP-HABF].
56
Brian Heater, Amazon Cites First Amendment Protection for Alexa in Arkansas Murder
Case, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 23, 2017, 8:45 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/23/alexa-freespeech [https://perma.cc/MSE7-PTGN].
57
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Amazon’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant, supra
note 32, at 37.
58
Thomas Brewster, Amazon Argues Alexa Speech Protected by First Amendment in Murder
Trial Fight, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2017, 7:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/
2017/02/23/amazon-echo-alexa-murder-trial-first-amendment-rights [https://perma.cc/BT8X
-K94U].
59
Heater, supra note 55.
53
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warrant and admitted as evidence by default. To understand why the legislature
would do this, the rules of evidence affecting always-listening device recordings
must also be understood.
II. PROSECUTION MOVES ALWAYS-LISTENING DEVICES INTO EVIDENCE
A. Transcripts and Recordings Under Nevada’s Hearsay Laws
Hearsay is an out of court statement offered into evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.60 This rule is in place almost identically across all jurisdictions in the United States.61 Hearsay is dangerous in the courtroom because it
carries several difficulties including trustworthiness, authentication, and reliability.62 However, when an out of court statement is surrounded by elements quelling those difficulties, the legal system is much more inclined to accept them.
Hence, there are several established exceptions to hearsay codified into the Nevada Revised Statutes and the Federal Rules of Evidence.63
The hearsay exception most applicable to audio recordings processed
through always-listening devices is likely the record of regularly conducted activity exception.64 This exception is often referred to as the business record exception and is used to admit business documents.65 It would stand to reason that
always-listening devices, which are certainly products within the overall business of their companies, would fall under this exception completely. However,
the exception might not necessarily cover the audio recordings from an alwayslistening device.
On the one hand, according to Amazon, always-listening device recordings
are not sold or actively traded.66 Nor are the audio recordings specifically used
in the smart assistant’s search function.67 Instead, the recordings are transcribed,
and that transcript is fed into the search algorithm for business use.68

60

NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.035 (2019); FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Rethinking the Rationale(s) for Hearsay Exceptions, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1485, 1485 (2016); see, e.g., COLO. R. EVID. 801(c); N.M. R. EVID. 11-801(C); IDAHO R.
EVID. 801(c).
62
See Carl C. Wheaton, What Is Hearsay?, 46 IOWA L. REV. 210, 219–20 (1961).
63
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 51.075–51.385 (2019). The Federal Rules of Evidence even provide a
catch all rule which makes admissible any statement supported by “sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness” which is “more probative on the point for which it is offered” than any other
reasonably obtainable evidence. FED. R. EVID. 807.
64
NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.135 (2019).
65
“The basis for the business record exception is that accuracy is assured because the maker
of the record relies on the record in the ordinary course of business activities.” A.L.M.N., Inc.
v. Rosoff, 757 P.2d 1319, 1326 (Nev. 1988) (quoting Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d
1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1981)).
66
Alexa, Echo Devices, and Your Privacy, supra note 25.
67
Id.
68
Id.
61
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On the other hand, the recordings are created in the process of transcribing,
which is a regularly conducted business activity.69 This may give the documents
the indicia of reliability that the regularly conducted business activity exception
relies on.70 However, without firmly meeting the requirements of the regularly
conducted business activity exception, the recordings must bypass Confrontation
Clause issues to be admissible.71
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause vests criminal defendants
with the right to confront witnesses testifying against him or her.72 As the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Idaho v. Wright, “[t]o be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia
of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness.”73 To meet this requirement, the recordings “must be at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a
firmly rooted hearsay exception” to the point that “adversarial testing would add
little to its reliability.”74
Audio recordings from always-listening devices should not have to pass
through these failsafe hearsay requirements to be admitted into evidence. Where
written documents may present questions of reliability and trustworthiness, audio recordings may overcome such issues uncomplicatedly.. For instance, a transcript could be written by or transcribed from anyone, with very little way to
guarantee that the document did or did not come from any specific person. With
audio recordings, however, voices can be compared and authenticated on a case
by case basis. In fact, the Nevada Revised Statutes already provide that voices
heard through electronic recordings may be sufficiently identified by opinion if
there is sufficient connection between the recording and the alleged speaker.75
Thus, Nevada should adopt a uniform hearsay exception for audio recordings
created by always-listening devices to avoid unnecessary litigation over the applicability of less exact exceptions that often result in admission of the recording
nevertheless.
B. Transcripts and Recordings Under Nevada’s Authentication Laws
One issue the legislature must consider is authentication of the recordings
themselves. While an electronically recorded voice may be authenticated by
opinion,76 parties may have extensive pre-trial arguments as to whether the

69

Id.
See Rosoff, 757 P.2d at 1326.
71
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990) (first citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543
(1986), then citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
72
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Wright, 497 U.S. at 822.
74
Id. at 821.
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recording may be presented in court at all.77 While there are arguments to be
made that the recording is self-authenticating or not, a solution to this inevitable
dispute may already exist within the Federal Rules of Evidence.78
Federal Rule of Evidence 902(13)—Certified Records Generated by an
Electronic Process or System—states, “[a] record generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate result” is self-authenticating so long as
a qualified person can certify the process or system.79 This categorization of selfauthenticating evidence is exactly the type of solution the Nevada legislature
should embrace ahead of any serious disputes about the authenticity of recordings from always-listening devices. By amending Nevada Revised Statute section 52 and adding a section to the presumptions of authenticity covering electronic processes and systems, any conflict surrounding the authenticity of
recordings can be handled without excessive litigation.
C. Transcripts Irrelevant When Recordings Available
With questions of authentication out of the way, there is a question to the
relevance of the recordings. Any evidence that is brought into a Nevada court
must be relevant.80 Nevada has defined relevant evidence to be “evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.”81 Whether audio recordings are relevant is a case-by-case determination, but one question must be answered to rationalize legislation creating a specific rule for always-listening devices’ audio recordings: whether the use of audio recordings is any more relevant than the use of transcripts that are likely to
already be admissible under the current rules of evidence?
The benefits of hearing these recordings are significant. Not only could the
audio recordings dispel any questions about who activated the device, but they
could also give key context of the tone, pace, and surrounding environment of
the speaker when the question was asked. The trier of fact can use this information to determine how much weight to give the evidence. When reading a
transcript is the only option, all that context is lost. Words on a page have only
the context that is awarded to them by the parties in court.82 While this Note does

77

E.g., White v. Texas, 549 S.W.3d 146, 149–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (noting the admissibility of an audio recording was the subject of pre-trial motions and argument).
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See FED. R. EVID. 902(13).
79
Id.
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.025 (2019).
81
Id. § 48.015.
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Norman N. Markel et al., The Relationship Between Words and Tone-of-Voice, 16
LANGUAGE & SPEECH 15, 15 (1973).
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not advocate for the removal of advocacy opportunities, the best evidence rule
implies that the recordings should be utilized if possible.83
The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced in
court when the content of that document is at issue.84 Nevadan litigators face
essentially identical versions of the best evidence rule in state and federal court.85
Indeed, Nevada Revised Statute section 52.235 and Federal Rule of Evidence
1002 both specifically require that the original writing, recording, or photograph
is to prove the content of the writing, recording, or photograph.86 Similarly, both
rules of evidence allow for the admission of copies if the original cannot “be
obtained by any available judicial process.”87
In the past, Nevada courts have referenced the best evidence rule, but only
to hold that an exception applied.88 For example, in Young v. Nevada Title Co.,
the Nevada Supreme Court held that the best evidence rule did not bar copies of
written work unless the writing is specifically offered into evidence to prove the
terms of the writing.89 Additionally, in Tomlinson v. Nevada, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the best evidence rule does not bar transcripts of audio
recordings to be admitted when the audio recording is no longer available.90 For
examples of the best evidence rule mandating an original copy, one must look to
opinions from the Ninth Circuit.91
In United States v. Workinger, the Ninth Circuit court considered whether
the best evidence rule had been violated when a transcript of an audio recording
was admitted at trial.92 The court ultimately held that the transcript of an audio
recording of defendant’s interview with his wife’s attorney was admissible because the audio recordings had been deleted in the ordinary course of business.93
However, the court noted that “the tape . . . was the best evidence of its own
83

Young v. Nevada Title Co., 744 P.2d 902, 904 (1987) (“[I]n proving the terms of a writing,
where the terms are material, the original writing must be produced unless it is shown to be
unavailable for some reason other than the serious fault of the proponent.” (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 230 (2d
ed. 1972))).
84
Id.
85
Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 52.235 (2019) (“To prove the content of a writing, recording
or photograph, the original writing, recording or photograph is required, except as otherwise
provided in this title.”), with FED. R. EVID. 1002 (“An original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove its content . . . .”).
86
NEV. REV. STAT. § 52.235 (2019); FED. R. EVID. 1002.
87
NEV. REV. STAT. § 52.255(2) (2019); FED. R. EVID. 1004(b).
88
See, e.g., Young, 744 P.2d at 904; Tomlinson v. Nevada, 878 P.2d 311, 312–14 (1994).
89
Young, 744 P.2d at 904.
90
Tomlinson, 878 P.2d at 312–14 (holding a transcript of an audio recording to be admissible
only because all audio copies had been destroyed).
91
See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 363 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2004) (excluding testimony
evidence about the path of the defendant’s boat because the data from the boat’s GPS was
available); United States v. Workinger, 90 F.3d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1996); Lang v. Cullen,
725 F. Supp. 2d 925, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
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Workinger, 90 F.3d at 1415.
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Id.
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content.”94 Thus, if the recording was available, the best evidence rule would
have compelled the court to admit the recording over a transcript.95
A recent example of this policy in action can be found in the Central District
of California.96 In Lang v. Cullen, Lang was arrested at the San Francisco International Airport for, inter alia, possession of a firearm without a permit.97 Several times over the next two weeks, Lang’s public defender and an investigator
from the public defender’s office interviewed Lang while tape-recording their
exchange.98 Prior to trial, the court granted Lang’s Motion in Limine to exclude
the transcripts of those interviews which were being maintained in the files of
the public defender’s office.99 The court held that because the audio recording
was still available, the best evidence rule mandated that the parties bring the recording into court, or leave out the content of the recording entirely.100
This doctrine has a clear application to always-listening devices. Whenever
a company details a transcript from an audio recording, there is a chance that
something is misinterpreted or misunderstood.101 With something used as frequently, and for as many reasons, as an always-listening device, there are simply
too many chances that a request was misunderstood, transcribed improperly, and
not reflected accurately by any written transcript. In the real world, a misstated
transcript could be pieced together, and the true meaning can be assumed. In a
court of law, there is too much on the line to leave an interpretation up to chance
when a better alternative exists. Thus, the best evidence rule should apply to audio recordings from always-listening devices, so the audio recordings are
brought into evidence whenever possible.
The issues of authentication and misapplication of searches made by devices
accessed by multiple individuals are also addressed by applying the best evidence
rule. A transcript made by the device could be based on the words of anyone.102
An audio recording does not have these issues, as Nevada already allows for
authentication of a voice by simply hearing it. Defendants and plaintiffs alike do
not have to worry about false searches being used against them if audio recordings are the preference. In fact, this creates an additional incentive to keep audio
recordings on the servers of whichever company hosts the always-listening device. If the recordings are being stored indefinitely, at no additional cost to the
94
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See id.; United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Id. at 971.
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Id. at 972–74.
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Order Granting Petitioner’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Transcript of Audiotape at 3,
Lang v. Woodford, No. CV-91-04061 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2010), rev’d sub nom. Lang v. Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 925, 925 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
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Sophie Curtis, Worst Alexa Fails: Amazon Echo Users Share Voice Assistant’s Biggest
Screw-Ups, MIRROR ONLINE (Jan. 2, 2018, 12:52 PM), https://www.mirror.co.uk/tech/worstalexa-fails-echo-amazon-11768630 [https://perma.cc/M2M9-A6F8].
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user, the user can prove that an incriminating use of the device was or was not
uttered by them.
One might assume that Nevada’s best evidence rule already covers audio
recordings from always-listening devices. However, remember that Nevada Revised Statute section 52.255(2) contains an exception which allows for transcripts of recordings to be admitted when “[n]o original can be obtained by any
available judicial process or procedure.”103 As discussed above, Arkansas was
unable to establish that companies like Amazon must submit audio recordings
when a court issues a subpoena for such a recording.104 If companies storing always-listening device audio recordings are not required to deliver audio recordings when Nevada courts request, prosecutors are hard pressed to introduce that
evidence without the consent of the defendant.105 Without federal legislation
compelling companies to comply with state subpoenas, the only audio recordings
covered by the best evidence rule are recordings stored in the physical memory
of the user’s always-listening device.106
This unfortunate reality raises an important question: how many recordings
are actually available to be brought into court? Even if a user manually enters
their device settings to delete the recordings, the audio recordings remain on the
device company’s servers.107 Yet, companies actively discourage their users from
deleting these recordings.108 For example, Amazon claims that by not deleting
the recordings, a user continuously improves their device’s ability to recognize
speech and language.109 While it is all but certain that at least some users have
deleted their recordings, it can be inferred that a vast majority of users have not
or will not delete their recordings.
Thus, by specifying that audio recordings still possessed on defendants’ devices must be disclosed if they are relevant to the suit, this new legislation would
address the issue of relevance and stand by Nevada’s best evidence rule.110
III. PROTECTING NEVADANS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
This Note cannot suggest that Nevada’s legislation codify a law requiring
individuals to submit always-listening device data to law enforcement without
first addressing the known constitutional issues such a law would bring. Part III
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 52.255(2) (2019).
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See supra text accompanying notes 55–59.
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of this Note specifically considers those constitutional issues and how they best
guide Nevada’s legislation.
A. Fourth Amendment Protections and Always-Listening Device Data
It has been argued that the government searching for and seizing recordings
from always-listening devices is inherently in violation of the Fourth Amendment.111 A common theme among those arguments is the overbreadth of the
third-party doctrine, which will be discussed below.112 Some argue that the thirdparty doctrine should not apply in cases where technology is involved because
of the near necessity of utilizing third parties in the modern age of technology.113
Others argue that the companies manufacturing the always-listening devices
should develop the devices in such a way that they do not fall under the thirdparty doctrine.114 Others argue that the third-party doctrine should be more narrowly construed so always-listening devices are considered as personal property
protected from physical trespasses by law enforcement.115
This Note argues that Nevada should not wait for Supreme Court interpretations of the third-party doctrine to change or burden companies with manufacturing requirements. Instead, Nevada should adhere to the advice of Justices
Alito and Thomas,116 and follow the path set by Utah117 by enacting its own legislation allowing law enforcement to retrieve data from any always-listening device so long as they obtain a warrant first.
The third-party doctrine has been discussed as a major issue with police access to private data.118 The doctrine, established by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Miller, excludes from Fourth Amendment protection data given up by

111

See, e.g., Julia R. Shackleton, Alexa, Amazon Assistant or Government Informant?, 27 U.
MIA. BUS. L. REV. 301, 322–23 (2019); Anne Pfeifle, Comment, Alexa, What Should We Do
About Privacy? Protecting Privacy for Users of Voice-Activated Devices, 93 WASH. L. REV.
421, 423 (2018); Katherine E. Tapp, Note, Smart Devices Won’t Be “Smart” Until Society
Demands an Expectation of Privacy, 56 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 83, 110 (2017).
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(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
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individuals to third parties.119 In Miller, the Court determined that Miller’s Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated when Miller’s bank gave his banking information to ATF.120 The Court reasoned that because Miller had entrusted the information to a third party, his bank, he could not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy to the information.121 In a digital age where almost all information is
stored on the server of one third party or another, even those within the Court
have grown concerned that the third-party doctrine has become overly broad.122
First, one proposed solution is to place the burden on the companies that
create and service the always-listening devices.123 Rather than exposing users to
privacy concerns under the third-party doctrine, companies could design the always-listening devices to store as much data as possible on the actual device in
encrypted format.124 Hypothetically, this could minimize the data that police or
federal agents could access when searching through the physical device without
a warrant, and would limit the overall amount of data subject to seizure solely
because it was transferred to third parties.
While this approach addresses some of the issues of always-listening devices
and privacy, it is unnecessary to provide Fourth Amendment protections to users.
The argument is not without merit, but it ignores the impact this would have on
users. These devices are not computers, cell phones, or servers. Always-listening
devices were not purchased en masse until prices dropped to $25-$50 because,
for most users, the devices serve the barebone purpose of a speaker and a search
engine.125
If companies are forced to overhaul the design of their products by including
encryption, mass storage, and other requirements to avoid falling under the thirdparty doctrine, the price of the devices would likely skyrocket. Nothing is stopping companies from moving into the market for expensive, secured, alwayslistening devices. Yet, consumers seem to want always-listening devices that are
affordable.126 Pricing out the average customer from always-listening devices is
not a simple solution to privacy concerns without consequence, it is a surefire
way to shut down companies’ interest in developing the technology further.
119
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Those who choose to purchase always-listening devices simply must understand
that convenience at such low prices comes with lessened protections for their
confidentiality.
Second, it has been argued that an unreasonable search occurs when police
gain information from always-listening devices without a compelling interest.127
This argument appears to analogize always-listening devices to personal property like an individual’s car.128 However, it also recognizes that the third-party
doctrine in its current form clearly applies to always-listening devices and even
distinguishes the devices from other physical assets.129 Accordingly, the argument compels courts to reconsider the third-party doctrine and to “use a narrower
construction that would greatly limit the government’s ability to obtain an individual’s personal and private information.”130
This argument appropriately recognizes that there are issues with police access to always-listening devices under currently enacted laws. However, this
Note disagrees with the perspective that the third-party doctrine grants “unfettered discretion to law enforcement” in its current form.131 Yes, the government
is currently able to gain access to data stored on always-listening devices, but it
is only able to do so in two ways.
The first way is accessing the always-listening device directly and pulling
any relevant information from it.132 However, as previously discussed, data is not
guaranteed to be stored on the device.133 Which leads to the second option, to
gain the recordings from the company that stores them.134 Yet, companies have
recognized that their users would rather not have their information spread to the
government without a compelling interest.135 In fact, companies thus far have
denied government requests to access this information, even in the face of a subpoena.136 If the current, broad, interpretation of the third-party doctrine does not
require compliance with governmental requests for the recordings, narrowing the
third-party doctrine so it does not apply to always-listening devices is unnecessary.
Finally, it has been argued that principles from the Stored Communications
Act137 should be applied to all digital data so long as the digital data is considered
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content information.138 The Stored Communications Act, passed in 1986, requires disclosure of wire or electronic communications that exist in electronic
storage upon proper government request.139 However, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(a), the government can only properly request such a disclosure from an
individual with a valid warrant.140 Accordingly, this argument suggests that the
lessened requirement for government requests for disclosure from the storage
companies be increased from subpoena to warrant.141
This argument provides excellent guidance for Nevada’s legislation. Nevada
has already shown favor for the Stored Communications Act by reference in Nevada Revised Statute section 179.467.142 All that remains is incorporating the
warrant requirement and specifically addressing audio recordings from alwayslistening devices. With these additions, the proposed law would provide law enforcement with access to always-listening devices, but would first require warrants to be issued on defendants for digital data they possess relevant to the specific crime. The law would both restrict evidence discovered from an alwayslistening device to relevant recordings and prevent law enforcement from conducting frivolous searches of devices without probable cause, quelling Fourth
Amendment concerns.
Fortunately, Nevada does not have to invent an entirely new set of laws to
properly address these issues. In 2019, Utah enacted the Electronic Information
or Data Privacy Act.143 This act adopts many of the principles of the Stored Communications Act without mandating that third parties comply with warrantless
requests for data.144 Specifically, it establishes that law enforcement may request
digital data from users of technology or from the third parties that store the data
so long as they have a valid warrant.145 The act also includes various exceptions
to the warrant requirement that mirror well established exceptions such as exigent circumstances or consent.146 Indeed, Utah’s Data Privacy Act serves as an
excellent template for Nevada to allow requests for always-listening device data
without violating the principles of the Fourth Amendment.
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B. First Amendment Issues yet Unanswered
The use of always-listening device recordings in criminal cases bring up
other issues that the courts have yet to address.147 One such issue is the First
Amendment concern that a recording of expressive material is admitted as evidence against a defendant without their consent.148 In the Bates case, Amazon
rejected a subpoena demand for search results and audio recordings from an Echo
device.149 Amazon contended that recordings taken by their devices contained
expressive material, and the device’s responses themselves contained expressive
material as well.150 Amazon also claimed that audio recordings should have First
Amendment protections attached,151 and the government should have to show a
compelling need for the data to bypass those protections.152
Unfortunately, the Arkansas court never had a chance to decide the issue in
Bates. The issue was bypassed because Bates consented to the use of the recordings.153 Thus, the issue of whether recordings of this type are considered expressive materials which are inadmissible absent clear consent remains merely in the
hypothetical. Yet, Nevada must take steps to enact legislation protecting Nevadan’s Fourth Amendment rights regardless of the unknown issues yet to be
fully analyzed in court.154
IV. WHAT’S THE USE? REAL WORLD IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGES
With so many issues surrounding always-listening devices, it is understandable to question why Nevada should pioneer legislation which enters recordings
and transcripts from always-listening devices into evidence by default. Part IV
of this Note presents situations where such data from always-listening devices is
incredibly useful to both law enforcement and users.
A. Always-Listening Devices in Criminal Cases
Just this year, recordings from an always-listening device have been sought
for use as evidence in a murder case.155 On July 12, 2019, Silvia Galva died from
147
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a stab wound to her chest.156 Her boyfriend, Adam Crespo, claimed to police that
the two were in an argument and he was trying to drag her out of bed.157 According to Crespo, he was facing away from her when she grabbed a spear with a
twelve inch blade, which snapped and impaled Galva’s chest as Crespo continued to try to pull her out of bed.158 Crespo then claimed that he then pulled the
blade out of her chest and put pressure on the wound while Galva’s friend called
911 and performed CPR.159 While Crespo claimed that he did not believe the
injury was severe, Galva died from her wounds, and Crespo was charged with
murder.160
This scenario is a perfect example of why always-listening devices should
be admissible as evidence by default. On its face, this is an incredibly difficult
situation for the justice system to deal with. While Crespo claimed that Galva’s
death was an accident, there were no witnesses in the bedroom that could corroborate or disprove his story.161 However, the police quickly started considering
one piece of evidence: Crespo’s Amazon Echo device.162 Just one month after
Galva’s death, Florida police were able to obtain a search warrant for all recordings taken by the two Echo devices in Crespo’s apartment on July 12, 2019.163
As previously discussed in this Note, Amazon has historically been unwilling to give out recordings taken by their users’ devices.164 In the Bates case discussed above, Amazon refused to comply with an Arkansas search warrant, and
only turned over the recordings when Bates consented to the police receiving
them.165 However, in Crespo, police claim to have received the recordings from
Amazon, with no official objections, after issuing their warrant.166 How these
recordings will affect the case is yet to be seen.167
The recordings may prove to be unhelpful to either party in this case. Perhaps
the event could have been missed altogether if the Echo was not activated during
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the argument. Alternatively, the Echo could have been activated but still failed
to record anything of use, or the Echo could have recorded damning evidence
that helps one of the parties prove their case. No matter the outcome, it is important that the police and the defendant be able to access the recordings of the
device so they can determine which of the situations they are facing. Further,
police receiving the recordings without intense litigation or Crespo’s consent
points to the gradual acceptance of always-listening device recordings being used
in the criminal justice system.
Despite Amazon’s spokespeople objecting to “overbroad or otherwise inappropriate demands” of customer information,168 it appears that Amazon’s stance
on the issue has shifted somewhat over the past few years.169 Amazon’s compliance with a warrant, absent public consent from their client, marks a new age for
always-listening devices in the justice system. While some argue that this new
age of always-listening devices is an invasion of privacy that ruins the sanctity
of the home,170 this Note argues that these devices have the potential to provide
safety to a group of people that are constantly in danger.
B. Always-Listening Devices as Deterrents to Domestic Violence
Domestic violence is an issue that affects more than ten million victims a
year in the United States.171 In a 2009 special report, the U.S. Department of
Justice published their findings on domestic violence in America.172 According
to the 2005 National Crime Victimization Survey, the annual domestic violence
rate—the amount of people who self-reported being victims of intimate partner
domestic violence—was 0.59 percent of women and 0.21 percent of men.173
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Always-listening devices have already been used to help protect domestic
violence victims.174 In July 2017, a woman activated her nearby Amazon Echo
device during a violent exchange with her boyfriend, Eduardo Barros, in their
New Mexico home.175 The device called 911, and dispatchers heard the woman
yelling “Alexa, call 911.”176 Police arrived at the scene and eventually arrested
Barros after an hours-long standoff.177 Referring to always-listening devices,
Sheriff Manuel Gonzales III later told reporters, “[t]his amazing technology definitely helped save a mother and her child from a very violent situation.”178
While the New Mexican woman’s active use of always-listening devices
protected her from an actively violent situation, the deterrent value of warrant
access to the audio recordings is far more widespread. It is sometimes wrongly
assumed that if victims know that they can dissuade their abusers from acting
violently by calling the police, they will.179 Even with police intervention available with a 911 call, studies show that many victims choose not to actively invoke
police protection.180 For victims that do not necessarily want their abusers to be
arrested or prosecuted, always-listening devices could provide an alternative
means of protection.
If a person fears for their safety in their own home, they would be able to
take control of a hostile situation by saying “Alexa/Google/Siri, record this conversation.” By recording the encounter, the victim would force the abuser to
deescalate because the audio of the interaction would be stored offsite. This process would provide victims an alternative means to dissuade their abusers in individual situations while collecting evidence of instances of abuse if they later
decide to involve the police.
Unfortunately, this deterrent value is stifled because prosecutors are not
guaranteed access to such recordings without the consent of the victim.181 Domestic violence studies suggest that prosecutors are less likely to charge for issues like attempted murder that required subjective findings like criminal intent.182 This was likely due to prosecutors generally facing hesitant involvement
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from victims who have close relationships with their abusers.183 Studies indicate
that it is not uncommon for victims to request the offender not be arrested184 and
almost half of victims do not wish for their abuser to be prosecuted.185
Because victims may be understandably hesitant to assist prosecutors, and
because there is no law which currently guarantees that recordings from alwayslistening devices may be seized and entered into evidence, the deterrent value of
always-listening devices is incredibly limited. Without key witnesses to assist,
law enforcement is currently shoehorned into charging for lesser offenses or dismissing the case entirely.186 To this point, one study revealed that in 1995, when
the Milwaukee prosecutor changed local policy to no longer require victims to
participate in charging conferences, prosecutors began accepting three times as
many domestic violence cases.187 The reasons that victims do not want to assist
with arrests or prosecutions is an invariably complicated issue, but one that could
be potentially bypassed in many situations by the presence of an always-listening
device.
Depending on the quality of recordings from always-listening devices, prosecutors could find that a victim’s testimony is unnecessary to prove instances of
violence and subjective criminal elements like criminal intent. It is in these situations that an always-listening device specific rule of evidence would be imperative. Without the appropriate witness to lay the foundation for the recordings,
prosecutors could possess a smoking gun and have no way to bring it in to trial.
If Nevada were to implement this Note’s suggested changes to Nevada Revised
Statute section 52,188 the recordings could be brought in through the testimony
of an Amazon/Google/Apple employee who specializes in the storage and retrieval of always-listening device recordings.189
Accordingly, if abusers know that their actions in the home can be recorded
and accessed, even against their victim’s wishes, they would no longer be able
to rely on intimidating or persuading their victims to not call the police or participate in prosecution. The third-party involvement of always-listening devices
would serve as a significant deterrent to abusers acting violently towards others
in the home without marking the victims as the cause of the deterrent.
Of course, any deterrent value would rely on both a future where alwayslistening devices are so intertwined to home life that absence of these devices
183
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would be of note, and on a society that accepts and encourages the use of alwayslistening device recordings in this way. If Nevada adopts this Note’s suggestions
in anticipation of this future, always-listening devices could become a tool which
empowers domestic violence victims to retake control of their environment and
prevent future abuse.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEVADA
A. Minor Changes to Existing Nevada Laws
The issues above leave a difficult situation for legislators to work through as
they tackle always-listening devices. For legislation to allow audio recordings
taken by always-listening devices into evidence at trial, the legislation must address each of the many issues discussed above.
First, new laws must provide a standardized hearsay exception so the government is not forced to wedge the recordings in under another, less appropriate,
exception. Second, new laws must specify a process to ensure that audio from an
always-listening device is authenticated so the trier of fact need only determine
if the recording is of the defendant’s words.190 Third, new laws must establish
that the best evidence rule applies to transcripts of the audio recordings and thus
deny entrance of transcripts whenever audio recordings are available.191 Finally,
new laws must allow law enforcement access to devices whenever the recordings
are relevant, but still establish strong warrant requirements to avoid unconstitutional invasions of privacy.192
As to the hearsay issue, Nevada should enact a new exception to hearsay for
“smart assistant communications.” The exception should allow audio recordings
created by smart assistants through always-listening devices to bypass hearsay
objections. This will negate unnecessary objections to recordings that, if authenticated and determined to be spoken by the defendant, do not constitute traditional hearsay.
As to the authentication issue, Nevada should amend Nevada Revised Statute section 52 to include provisions from Federal Rule of Evidence 902(13). Nevada should specify that records generated by electronic processes or systems
that produce accurate results are authenticated so long as a qualified person can
certify the process or system.193 This will ensure that the trier of fact is able to
consider whether the defendant actually engaged with the device by matching
the voice recorded instead of text transcribed.
As to the relevance issue, Nevada should double-down on its version of the
best evidence rule by allowing law enforcement to request audio recordings when
it is relevant to a case. Nevada should enact legislation that gives law
190
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192
193
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enforcement a clear process to request such recordings from a defendant’s own
device and from companies who are willing to adhere to the request.
To that point, and as to the Fourth Amendment concerns, Nevada should
enact legislation similar to Utah’s Electronic Information or Data Privacy Act.194
Nevada should enact legislation that allows law enforcement to request data from
always-listening devices from users or the third-parties that store the data. However, the legislation must require warrants to ensure that only relevant, particular,
and necessary data is accessed.
CONCLUSION
With relatively minor changes to already existing Nevada Law, Nevada can
avoid facing the same evidentiary, constitutional, and ethical questions Arkansas
faced in Bates or Florida faced in Crispo. Instead, Nevada can move forward
with confidence that the new age of always-listening devices will not hinder the
administration of justice or diminish Nevadans’ constitutional rights.
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